




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The Queen's Conceit in Shakespeare's *Richard II*

COLLEEN RUTH ROSENFELD

In act II, scene ii of Shakespeare's *Richard II*, the Queen knows something that no one else knows. The form of her knowledge, which she describes as the "thought, on thinking on no thought I think," is the subject of this article.¹ After Richard departs for Ireland, the Queen cannot fulfill her promise, as recounted to us by Bushy, "To lay aside life-harming heaviness" (II.ii.3). She offers the following explanation for her sadness: "methinks, / Some unborn sorrow, ripe in Fortune's womb, / Is coming towards me, and my inward soul / With nothing trembles" (II.ii.9–12). When Green steps on stage and announces Bolingbroke's illegal return from exile, the Queen sees her earlier metaphor through to its climactic conclusion: "So, Green, thou art the midwife to my woe, / And Bolingbroke my sorrow's dismal heir" (II.ii.62–3). As "a gasping new-delivered mother," she names the usurper "heir" and provides an obscure genealogy for England's turbulent monarchical history (II.ii.65). But prior to Green's revelation: What does the Queen know? How does the Queen know what she knows?

Criticism's favorite answer to these questions is "intuition."² Describing the Queen's knowledge as "the irrational power of the Queen's intuition,"³ "the intuitive grief she has been feeling,"⁴ what "her feminine intuition detects,"⁵ and "the validity of her own intuition,"⁶ the play's modern readers understand the Queen's knowledge to be the expression of latent reproductive capacities—capacities that Shakespeare is said to highlight by transforming history's Queen Isabel, aged ten, into "a full-grown woman" who "metaphorically gives birth."⁷ According to this line

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of thinking, Bolingbroke's return substantiates what Jeanie Grant Moore calls the Queen's "shadowy intuition."⁸ More recent criticism has traded in the language of "intuition" for the language of "premonition."⁹ Whereas intuition has the effect of withdrawing knowledge from the Queen even as it names that knowledge, premonition validates her knowledge but only by casting it as the product of a future that is already written. As Zenón Luis-Martínez writes, "the Queen, a feminine voice emerging from the margins of history, voices unknown premonitions."¹⁰ According to these readings, the Queen's knowledge is authorized by its inevitable accuracy; her language of reproduction doubles for the necessity of succession in a linear conception of historical time.¹¹ The Queen has inexplicable access to a future that she is powerless to avert. Maybe she has this access because she is neurotic—"anxiety" is the word you often hear.¹²

Neither intuition nor premonition allows us to understand the form of the Queen's knowledge in this scene. Both require that we read the Queen's figure as if it aligns with the biological act of reproduction to which it seems to refer. When critics write that the Queen gives birth to an "unborn sorrow," however, they elide a crucial dissonance within the logic of her figure; this elision permits for both intuition's residence in the Queen's reproductive system and premonition's predication on straight-shot temporal succession from the present to an already determined future. Before the Queen assigns Green the role of "midwife to my woe," this "unborn sorrow" did not reside in her body at all: "Some unborn sorrow, ripe in Fortune's womb, / Is coming towards me." The pervasive critical misreading silently performs an organ transplant. The Queen's figure requires us to imagine that she is delivered of what was growing in someone else's womb.¹³

The word I offer to describe the Queen's knowledge is "conceit."¹⁴ "Conceit" is initially introduced by Bushy in order to dismiss the value of the Queen's knowledge, but the Queen subsequently affirms the accuracy of Bushy's label even as she reverses the value he assigned. "'Tis nothing but conceit, my gracious lady," says Bushy; "'Tis nothing less," the Queen replies (II.ii.33–4). Bushy says that the Queen's knowledge is "nothing but conceit" and therefore should be valued as such; the Queen reverses this evaluation when she insists that what she knows is "nothing less" than "conceit" and therefore should be valued as such. Bushy dismisses the Queen's conceit because he thinks it substitutes "shadows / Of what it is not" for an accurate representation of what it is (II.ii.22–3). The Queen grants that he might

be right: "It may be so" (II.ii.28). This article follows the Queen's subsequent, adversative turn against this admission: "but yet my inward soul / Persuades me it is otherwise" (II.ii.28–9). Bushy understands the conceit as a device "Which for things true weeps things imaginary" (II.ii.27); I argue that the Queen's conceit returns "things true" to the ground of poetic possibility where they may yet be "otherwise."

When the play's modern readers understand the conceit as either—to cite Christopher Johnson's entry in *The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics*—"the 'idea' informing a poem or a play" or "an esp. elaborate metaphor or simile," we attribute a centripetal, consolidating force to the form by positing a logic that underwrites figuration and determines its semantic range.¹⁵ This model of the conceit suggests that the Queen's figure is reducible to a single, organizing foundation—like the historical deposition of Richard; this foundation corresponds, in turn, to a single trope that coordinates and explains the range of the conceit's imaginative and epistemological possibilities. Usually, that trope is metaphor.¹⁶ The Queen's conceit would thus represent Bolingbroke's return, which—as the impossible agency of Green's announcement underscores—both precipitates and enacts Richard's deposition: "The banished Bolingbroke repeals himself" (II.ii.49). Under this model, the organizing logic of the conceit is recoverable and the primary reading it solicits is the act of recovery. Bushy's own much-discussed conceit of the "twenty shadows" cast by "Each substance of a grief" has also courted this kind of reading (II.ii.14). When Bushy compares the Queen's knowledge to "perspectives" that must be "eyed awry" to "Distinguish form," our own historically informed knowledge of anamorphic art acts as a cipher to decode his difficult simile (II.ii.18–20).¹⁷ In the Royal Shakespeare Company's 2013 production of *Richard II*, Bushy produces a perspectival device from behind his back as he elaborates his conceit—as if a stage property might materialize the strange logic of his simile.¹⁸

If the Queen's conceit is reducible to the history of English monarchical succession, then the temporal paradox of this scene is that the truth value of the Queen's conceit is guaranteed by England's future. Under this reading, the Queen's conceit generates an obscurity that permits her to withhold knowledge from herself.¹⁹ The Queen would thus speak what Katherine Eggert has called "disknowledge"—the knowledge one manufactures in order to not know something else.²⁰ In a similar vein, Harry Berger Jr. writes that the Queen's "presentiment of giving birth to the

monster ... is expressed in language so dense and tortured as to be conspicuously evasive ... What does she flinch from as if trying not to acknowledge the (no)thing she knows, not to utter the name of the woe she bears?"²¹ By these accounts, "Some unborn sorrow" stands in the place of another name that the Queen's metaphor keeps at bay but that history secures—another name, such as Bolingbroke. In this article, I read the Queen's conceit not for what she tries hard not to say but for what she conspicuously speaks.²² The particular location of "Some unborn sorrow" in "Fortune's womb," rather than the Queen's own, compels us to rethink the form of the conceit as one that is not reducible to a single idea, metaphor, or design that conceptually precedes the language it then governs. The form of the conceit instead extends an invitation to its readers to inhabit a structure of thinking artificially displayed before them; the Queen's conceit invites its readers to draw the coordinates of a history we already know so as to recognize the possibility that things could have gone otherwise.

As Jeremy Lopez has written, from the nineteenth-century identification of Richard as "a figure for the poet" through the historicist countercurrent of the twentieth century, "modern criticism of *Richard II* is preoccupied ... with the problem of the meaning and function of poetry as such."²³ This article is no exception. But if "critical engagements with *Richard II* can be seen ... as a highly localized site for competition between transcendental and historicized conceptions of the poet-king of our literary canon, Shakespeare himself," one aim of this article is to rethink the relation of poetry to history outside of the hermeneutic pull of the historico-formal Richard/Bolingbroke binary and from the perspective of the play's lesser-read poet-queen.²⁴ I argue that the Queen's conceit permits her to know, not the necessary future that Green's role as "midwife" might seem to confirm, but the contingency of a future event that could have gone otherwise than it will. The critical tradition's dubious defense of the Queen misses the point. What is important about the Queen's knowledge is not, as Philip Lorenz writes, that she "quite correctly perceives that Richard's departure to Ireland signals a coming sorrow: namely the rise of Bolingbroke."²⁵ What is important about her knowledge is that it is poetic. She speaks a language that, as Sir Philip Sidney described it in *The Defence of Poesy* (ca. 1580), "nothing affirms" and therefore cannot be judged true or false.²⁶ What the Queen knows is the poetic field within which Shakespeare's history play transpires. In the Queen's conceit, affirmation looks like trembling: "and my inward soul / With nothing trembles."

I. THE QUEEN'S KNOWLEDGE

The Queen's knowledge does not walk the edge of Occam's Razor: it does not travel the shortest distance from the fact of Richard's absence to the fact of Bolingbroke's return. Instead, the Queen's knowledge—or thinking, as she describes it—follows the inelegant adversative turns of “Yet” (II.ii.6). In response to Bushy's reminder that she promised “To lay aside life-harming heaviness,” she explains:

To please the King I did; to please myself
 I cannot do it. Yet I know no cause
 Why I should welcome such a guest as Grief,
 Save bidding farewell to so sweet a guest
 As my sweet Richard. Yet again, methinks,
 Some unborn sorrow, ripe in Fortune's womb,
 Is coming towards me, and my inward soul
 With nothing trembles. At something it grieves
 More than with parting from my lord the King.
 (II.ii.3 and 5–13)

The curious thing about the Queen's knowledge is that she does not know what she knows. She readily admits her promise and confirms Bushy's sense that she has broken that promise. This would be comprehensible if her sadness had a “cause” that she had not anticipated: “Yet I know no cause.” The Queen's subsequent “Yet again” sends her thinking along another path while also ascribing to that path a temporal dimension. Is she speaking this thought again? “Yet again” might usher on stage an earlier conversation to which we otherwise have no access. Or does she find herself describing a phenomenon that has occurred before? The “something” that is happening is happening “Yet again.” In this case, the Queen's future has been gaining on her from behind, withstanding the duck and swerve of her repeated evasions.

The twists to the Queen's thinking—organized along the inefficient axes of “Yet”—combine an adversative turn against her interlocutor with the strange temporality that her conceit will detail. If “again” looks back to a history that it repeats, “Yet” turns toward “something” that has not previously occurred but that its capacious gesture toward the future admits into the realm of possibility.²⁷ The Queen calls this phenomenon “Some unborn sorrow.” As the conceit circulates in the conventional shorthand of criticism, including this article: “the ‘unborn sorrow,’” or “Isa-

bel's 'unborn sorrow,'" or "her 'unborn sorrow.'" ²⁸ The possessive forms conflate the Queen's figure with her body: "Some unborn sorrow" is "her 'unborn sorrow'" because Shakespeare's Queen gives birth to the necessary future of English monarchical history instead of the heir that the historical Isabel would have supplied. If the Queen's proper name anchors her character to this particular history, it is significant that Shakespeare's play nowhere identifies her by that name. And while a definite article avoids this collapse, "the 'unborn sorrow'" ushers in the kind of certainty that reinforces the language of "premonition." The Queen's "unborn sorrow" and the future to which she will inevitably give birth is certain because history tells us that Bolingbroke will depose the King and claim his crown.

"Some unborn sorrow" might refer to a specific and determined "unborn sorrow," but "Some" might equally refer to a specific but undetermined "unborn sorrow." Namely, "some unborn sorrow or another." "Some" says, "I can know the form of sorrow and yet not know what this sorrow will be. If I knew the historical actualization of this sorrow, then this knowledge would allow me to describe this phenomenon within more traditional models of causation. I would know 'the cause' instead of 'no cause.' If, however, I know the form of a sorrow that any number of particulars might actualize, then I am dealing in an altogether different kind of knowledge." This knowledge cannot be explained by more traditional models of causation because it is attuned to a different order of reality. It is not simply, as Graham Holderness suggests, that the Queen "describe[s] this experience of unfocused sorrow awaiting a cause to which it may be attached."²⁹ It is, instead, that the object of her knowledge exists in an alternative causal order.

By way of Islamic philosopher Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā), James A. Knapp has described the Queen's knowledge as the perception of her "inward sense": what she perceives is "form without matter."³⁰ This is why, for Knapp, "The queen's perception is potential rather than actual at this point," such that Green's subsequent announcement lends a name to a different order of phenomena: "Yet before Green enters, the queen's inward sense impresses upon her inward soul a perception of the world not available to the outward sense."³¹ "Some" registers the causal order within which "form without matter" resides: not yet actualized. "Some unborn sorrow" is contingent insofar as the event that will mark its entry into historical orders of causation may be or may not be. To be sure, "Some" does not introduce the radical contingency of a future that is so open it might even be said to be happy.³² The

Queen's future will necessarily be a source of grief—a necessity expressed in the strange temporality that permits it to already be a source of grief—but the deposition around which the historical narrative of *Richard II* revolves is a contingent event: it may be or it may not be.³³

Here is another way of thinking about my claim: the difference between the necessary future of a history that had to happen and the contingency of a future that could have gone otherwise than it will is the difference between Fortune's wheel and Fortune's womb. The iconography of Fortune's wheel distilled the moralizing of the *de casibus* tradition into an image of the "inevitability" of Fortune's "instability"; Fortune's wheel was, as Helen Cooper has described, uneasily assimilated into a providential vision of history.³⁴ Fortune's wheel underwrites the speech we hear from the dead Richard in *A Myrroure for Magistrates* (1559), where he discovers the likelihood of his fall lodged within his own actions: "Shame sueth sinne, as rayne drops do the thunder."³⁵ Richard's analogy transforms his murdered body into a warning for others: "Let Princes therfore vertuous life embrace / That wilfull pleasures cause them not to blunder."³⁶ Lesson learned. Likely deriving from Fortuna's early characterization as "the local patroness of childbearing" and bubbling up from an etymological brew that combines *fors* (chance) with *fero* (a sense of "to bear" that includes "offspring" among its possible objects), Fortune's womb does not have the same pervasive iconographical tradition as her wheel.³⁷ This Fortune, insistent on chance, remains hostile to providential design; as Daniel Heller-Roazen explains, *fortuna* is "that by which a thing takes place in one way while being essentially capable of having taken place otherwise."³⁸ Rather than having uncanny access to a future that has already passed into the historical record, the Queen speaks a language adequate to the contingent event where "what is contingent can always be otherwise than it is."³⁹

The location of "Some unborn sorrow" in "Fortune's womb" generates the distinct modality of the historical event that could have gone otherwise. This historical event is not necessary even though it has already occurred. At the moment of its articulation, the Queen's conceit draws the dramatic space of the stage according to the logic of the poetic knowledge that underwrites and makes possible what might have been. Instead of staging Bolingbroke's return—something similar to what Shakespeare does with Richard's homecoming in act III, scene ii—the Queen's conceit stages knowledge of this return. While it might seem that

the absence of the event contributes to the historical perspective from which Bolingbroke has always already returned, the staging of this form of knowledge instead transforms the theater into the field of possibility within which Shakespeare's history transpires. Between "Yet again" and the assignment of parts—you play the midwife, you my sorrow's heir—the Queen's conceit locates what was as mere point on the poetic grid of what may be.

II. THE QUEEN'S PLEASURE

One critical commonplace about the history plays reminds us that Shakespeare's audience already knows what will happen.⁴⁰ By placing "Some unborn sorrow" in "Fortune's womb," the Queen's conceit lends a shimmer to an event we more usually take on guarantee.⁴¹ Why? One answer to this question would describe the ethical implications of Shakespeare's historiographical practices. In spite of the fact that the future is already written and in spite of the hermeneutic allure of this fact, the Queen's conceit articulates historical contingency and subtly solicits a range of ethical considerations, including the personal obligation to act or not to act. It is in this context, for example, that what Melissa E. Sanchez calls the Queen's "prudence" becomes most significant: "Isabel's 'unborn sorrow, ripe in Fortune's womb' describes not an abstract fear or hunch, but a political threat that is as material, as saturated with expectation and potentiality, as the fetus to which she compares it."⁴² Bushy carelessly dismisses this "threat," and our critical frames for recovering it repeat that dismissal under the guise of advocacy.

The Queen offers yet another answer to the question of why:

BUSHY. You promised, when you parted with the King,
To lay aside life-harming heaviness
And entertain a cheerful disposition.
QUEEN. To please the King I did; to please myself
I cannot do it.

(II.ii.2–6)

The Queen's pleasure has not been of central concern to scholarship that—following the lead of the chronicle accounts of Edward Hall and Raphael Holinshed—takes up Richard's putatively single-minded pursuit of his own pleasure.⁴³ As Hall writes, the King "did all thyng at his pleasure" and, as *A Myrroure for Magistrates*

teaches us, “willful pleasures” are the “cause” of a fall that can be avoided if you “vertuous life embrace.”⁴⁴ The play’s modern readers have been largely concerned with Bolingbroke’s account of the recipients of Richard’s “embrace.”⁴⁵ Bolingbroke charges Bushy and Green:

You have in manner with your sinful hours
 Made a divorce betwixt his queen and him,
 Broke the possession of a royal bed
 And stained the beauty of a fair queen’s cheeks
 With tears drawn from her eyes by your foul wrongs.
(III.i.11–5)

Bolingbroke transforms the “royal bed” into a game of musical chairs in which the Queen is left awkwardly standing. Her tears signify her exclusion from reproductive sex, and her “unborn sorrow” becomes the sign of her husband’s pleasure rather than her own. Shakespeare’s revision of history’s prepubescent Isabel manufactures the cost of Richard’s queer pleasure as if in confirmation of Bolingbroke’s charge.⁴⁶

We have read the Queen’s “tears” as those shed by a bystander dismissed from her own marriage bed. But there is something more to Bolingbroke’s charge and its strategic ambiguity. Who is doing what to whom? How does Bolingbroke manage to imply both that Richard is having sex with his counselors instead of his wife and that this sex leaves the crown vulnerable to the claim of an imposter? Bolingbroke suggests that, when Bushy and Green “Broke possession of the royal bed / And stained the beauty of a fair queen’s cheeks,” they introduced the specter of illegitimacy into Richard’s line. It is as if the illegitimate issue of the Queen’s adultery—which never happened and does not exist—nonetheless threatens the integrity of a monarchical line that Bolingbroke himself will disrupt. In the weird genealogy that haunts act II, scene ii, the Queen incorporates Bolingbroke into the monarchical line through an act of adultery retroactively disguised as midwifery. Bolingbroke’s innuendo raises the surprising possibility that the Queen’s “tears” are not the sign of her exclusion from the erotic life of the “royal bed” but the primary means of her participation.

Bushy thinks that when you look through “Sorrow’s eyes, glazed with blinding tears,” you are overcomplicating the matter (II.ii.16). Shakespeare’s Queen maintains a skeptical distance between herself and the simplest explanation for her sadness: Richard’s absence. When Bushy reminds her that she promised

to "entertain a cheerful disposition," she elaborates on the social relation latent in Bushy's rebuke by assigning "Grief" the part of her "guest": "Yet I know no cause / Why I should welcome such a guest as Grief."⁴⁷ The Queen readily admits that she greets "Grief" as a "guest" in order to "please" herself. That she "entertains" "Grief" in the absence of her husband is an open secret.⁴⁸ That she will "entertain" something in the place of her husband is in fact given. What is at stake is that she chooses "Grief" over a "cheerful disposition." The King's pleasure runs one way; the Queen's pleasure runs another.

With "Grief" as her "guest," the Queen invokes the presence of an allegorical personification who dogs the play's historical actors. The Duchess of Gloucester, Bolingbroke, Gaunt, and Richard each describe an intimacy with "Grief"—as "companion," as "journeyman," and as the houseguest of horror films.⁴⁹ It might therefore be useful to imagine "Grief" as the personification of a dramaturgical relation. In *The Forms of the Affects*, Eugenie Brinkema reminds us of "the etymological intimacy of *grief* and *gravity*, both from *gravis* (weighty)": grief is "a vector of invisible force pulling down and down further still."⁵⁰ Brinkema calls this "the formal force" of grief—its capacity to organize bodies in relation to one another around an absence.⁵¹ In act I, scene ii, the Duchess of Gloucester bids goodbye to Gaunt with an oblique threat of suicide: "Thy sometimes brother's wife, / With her companion, Grief, must end her life" (I.ii.54–5). Gaunt replies with a couplet in kind but the Duchess continues, "Yet one word more. Grief boundeth where it falls, / Not with the empty hollowness, but weight" (I.ii.58–9). "Grief" was previously an allegorical figure whom the Duchess employed as a "companion." With "Yet one word more," the Duchess attributes a physics to grief that is an alternative to personification. The reverberation of sound might indicate that the stage is a hollowed-out cave, but the felt mass of grief substantiates and makes weighty the hollow itself. What exceeds allegory is "the formal force" of grief; speaking of film, Brinkema writes, "*Here is where being would have been*, says the subjunctive tense of this shot."⁵² In the temporal scheme of the Queen's conceit, we have something between the subjunctive and what J. K. Barret describes as the second future of "anticipatory nostalgia": *Here is where being will have would have been*.⁵³ It is not elegant, but it is true.

The Queen speaks her conceit in the service of a pleasure that she takes for granted but does not understand as "cause." Pleasure is instead the ground on which causation occurs: "To

please the King I did; to please myself / I cannot do it. Yet I know no cause." There is something Bartlebian about the Queen's expression of preference.⁵⁴ Whereas Bartleby mostly replies with the conditional, "I would prefer not to," the Queen's evasion of the indicative takes the more oblique form of an infinitive.⁵⁵ Insofar as "to please myself" runs symmetrically against "to please the King," it means "in order to." The parallel syntax suggests that the Queen aims to please herself as if she were someone other than herself. But with the second repetition of "to please," her infinitive loosens its grip on its object and sounds more like this: "in order to establish the conditions under which it would be possible to please myself." "To please myself" has the paradoxical effect of making her pleasure central to her choice to "welcome such a guest as Grief" and of divorcing that pleasure from her experience of the indicative. Under the first reading, the "it" that she "cannot do" refers to "entertain a cheerful disposition." Under the second reading, "it" points back to the promise itself, the fulfillment of which would bind her to a predetermined future: "to please the king, I promised to entertain a cheerful disposition; to create the conditions under which it would be possible to please myself, I cannot fulfill that promise." The Queen derives pleasure from her refusal to enter into this particular future. The Queen's conceit is the form of her refusal.

III. THE QUEEN'S CONCEIT

If we could reshuffle the deck of the Queen's conceit and deal another hand, we might turn to allegory to describe the form of the conceit and the knowledge that it organizes. She would take pleasure in "Grief" in the place of the absent king and produce a "sorrow" that remains "unborn" until Green steps on stage. Indeed, the model of the conceit that the Queen herself articulates after Green's announcement—the model according to which "I, a gasping new-delivered mother, / Have woe to woe, sorrow to sorrow joined" (II.ii.65–6)—is an allegorical reduction of poetry to history akin to typological fulfillment and proceeds from a conception of time that is always orienting toward the necessary future it will fulfill.⁵⁶

"Fortune's womb," however, points to an alternative understanding of the conceit. Fortune's model of causation is action at a distance, and the Queen's conceit posits the order of a universe in which poetry logically and temporally precedes the historical realm that it organizes.⁵⁷ According to this genealogy, the "fore-

father grief" of the Queen's conceit is the "nothing" that poetry substantiates when it speaks the language of contingency: "For nothing hath begot my something grief, / Or something hath the nothing that I grieve" (II.ii.35–7). The Queen's conceit uses allegory to signal a principle of abstraction that returns history to the ground of poetic possibility. What is important about "Some unborn sorrow" is that it introduces this abstraction: "Some" suggests that there is more than one possible "unborn sorrow." "Some" is the conceit's mechanism for moving among possibilities and preserving the contingency of the event it describes. Every time an actor clutches her abdomen while speaking these lines, this gesture reduces this field of possibility to the mere history of what was.

As the Queen continues, her conceit marks out the difference between its own operations and the operations of allegory: "methinks, / Some unborn sorrow, ripe in Fortune's womb, / Is coming towards me, and my inward soul / With nothing trembles." "[N]othing" causes her to "tremble" in anticipation of a future that does not yet exist. And yet, "with" might also indicate, as with the Duchess, a "companion." "My inward soul / With nothing trembles" because she trembles alongside "nothing," which is also trembling. Or is it also "who" trembling? As this shift in relative pronouns indicates, "with" might be the syntactical site in which "nothing," trembling of its own accord and in parallel with the Queen, approaches the subject position of "Nobody." Yet again, "with" launches "nothing" toward that subject position, but it does not result in allegorical personification. "[N]othing" acts in unison with the Queen without becoming "nobody."⁵⁸

The Queen's response to Bushy preserves the possibility of his account of reality not because she agrees with him but because the central feature of her language in this scene, up until the moment of Green's announcement, is this act of preservation:

It may be so; but yet my inward soul
 Persuades me it is otherwise. Howe'er it be,
 I cannot but be sad—so heavy sad
 As thought, on thinking on no thought I think,
 Makes me with heavy nothing faint and shrink.

(II.ii.28–32)

The Queen's "inward soul" does not replace Bushy's explanation with its own but insists that what she knows is "otherwise" to Bushy's explanation. The "nothing" alongside which she "faint[s]

and shrink[s]" is not "heavy" because she is pregnant but because grief brings to the conceit its own gravity. The parallel motions exhibited by the Queen and "nothing" in this scene are caused by poetic affirmations described here as "thought, on thinking on no thought I think." This model of the conceit stakes a claim to what the act of thinking is capable of. The Queen is able to think what is unthinkable to herself—she thinks the very thought that is also "no thought I think." Or she turns her mind on the act of thinking so that she thinks the act without fixed object or outcome. Or she describes what it takes to produce "no thought" out of the act of thinking: counterbalance the weight of your sadness against the weight of "nothing." The Queen's conceit affirms the existence of "nothing," but the form of this affirmation is not the logical proposition; she does not speak words with the primary aim of conferring sense on the world around her. The Queen's conceit instead affirms the existence of "nothing" through this shared act of trembling.

The textual crux of "As thought, on thinking on no thought I think" epitomizes the critical contention I have identified. The edition I have been quoting from preserves the phrasing of the first quarto, but the second quarto reads, and most modern editions prefer: "As though, on thinking on no thought I think." "As though" is cleaner from both an editorial and aesthetic perspective. "As thought" has the dubious distinction of an ugly puzzle. We need both. "As though" casts the Queen's knowledge as a speculation of fiction. "As though" specifies the distinct modality within which "thinking on no thought" occurs. "As thought," however, does the work of negotiating between the mood of poetry and the mood of history. "As thought" performs this negotiation by making the Queen's knowledge, first, temporally simultaneous with her sadness and, second, the comparative measure of her sadness. Just how "heavy" is the Queen's sadness? It is as heavy, as weighty, "As thought, on thinking on no thought I think."

A scene from Samuel Daniel's *The Civil Wars* (1595) offers us a sense of what the Queen's conceit might have looked like if it were reproductive.⁵⁹ Standing at her window, Isabel first mistakes Bolingbroke for her husband at the head of the procession. She looks again to find Richard bringing up the rear. She wants and does not want to see Richard in this man: "And be it not my Lord, although it may."⁶⁰ The narrator describes her position as, "Knowing, yet struing not to know 'twas hee: / Her heart ... would not yeeld to thinke what was, could be."⁶¹ Daniel's Queen refuses to know the conditions of possibility that underwrite the very reality

she nonetheless recognizes as true: the “could be” within which “what was” takes place. When the Queen and Richard meet, they almost give birth to a “sorrow” that instead “perishes vnborne”:

Both bigge with sorrow, and both great with wo
 In labour with what was not to be borne:
 This mightie burthen, wherewithall they goe,
 Dies vndeliuered, perishes vnborne;
 Sorrow makes silence her best Orator,
 Where words may make it lesse, not shew it more.⁶²

In Daniel's version, Richard and Isabel labor in parallel privacy but produce one thing: “what was not to be borne.” This kind of reproduction is only possible in “silence.” Had Richard and Isabel spoken, they would have delivered two “mightie burthen[s]”; it is only because both refrain from language that they can make just one thing between the two of them. This “mightie burthen” has the paradoxical existence of no thing: it “dies vndeliuered” and “perishes vnborne.”

Daniel's word for what Shakespeare's conceit renders as potential is “silence.” To pick up an analogy from Gérard Genette in *Figures of Literary Discourse*, the King and Queen's restraint is like selecting a blank record: “on certain jukeboxes one can get, for the same price as the latest tune, a period of silence equal to that of a record; it may in fact be a blank record specially made for this purpose.”⁶³ The blank record restructures the aural landscape in which it spins according to certain formal properties shared by records that could have been selected, most notably, approximate duration. The form of the blank record not only bears the trace of the songs that could have been played, but also insists that each of these songs is a diminished actualization of its own singular achievement. Both this claim and its corresponding demand on the inhabitants of this space are more than a little menacing. The vulnerability of the blank record's achievement is a power over its audience. Where Daniel heard an end-stopped line—“perishes vnborne; / Sorrow makes silence”—Shakespeare heard enjambment—“Some unborn sorrow.” In what Stephen Booth would call the “precious nonsense” of this phrase, Daniel's silence lingers in Shakespeare's alliteration.⁶⁴

IV. INHABITING THE QUEEN'S CONCEIT

By way of conclusion, I would like to consider the Queen's conceit not as an object of criticism but as a model for criticism of the sort that Christopher Warley has described via Theodor W. Adorno as "complete submission to the matter at hand,' that is, when you immerse yourself in the form of the work of art."⁶⁵ You immerse yourself in form by treating form as the peculiar structure of fiction in the broadest sense of the term, "less as a channel that separates off the utopian program so much as a line that marks an edge that makes possible the impossible."⁶⁶ The Queen's repeated use of "Yet" pulls into focus Warley's definition of "criticism" as the "craft of hesitation."⁶⁷ Andrew Miller has described a similar critical phenomenon as "implicative" because the work of criticism "enfolds" its reader in the "event" of the art object it describes: "implicative" criticism expands the borders of art so as to include the act of criticism itself.⁶⁸

But once you have followed the path of the prefix "in"—immerse, implicate, enfold—how do you continue living in history? What distinguishes formalism from political quietism and retreat? Formalism's most vocal advocates in Shakespeare studies have largely turned to historicism in an effort to answer this question. "Historical formalism" returns the category of form to the center stage of criticism while adhering to the protocols of evidence and argumentation characteristic of the New Historicism.⁶⁹ One of the central methodological contributions of historical formalism may be its confirmation that the New Historicism was always at heart a formalist practice.⁷⁰ A more experimental renewal of form has taken place among those scholars who, following the work of Bruno Latour, posit a flat ontology and a world in which, as Caroline Levine has proposed, social and aesthetic forms "collide."⁷¹ Any methodology, however, that treats poem and tree as ontologically interchangeable cannot account for the crucial category that the Queen's conceit constructs—namely fiction, or the place that poetry carves out in the world for what may be as distinct from what is, what was, or what will be.⁷² By taking up the Queen's conceit as a model for criticism, formalism's capacity for political engagement assumes another shape. If a formalist practice understands the literary artifact as a way of thinking irreducible to the historical, philosophical, and intertextual resources that fuel its operations, this irreducibility is important because it is what permits us to recognize the world of what is as only one among many possibilities. Formalism treats the literary

as a device for imagining the world of what is, to borrow a word from the Queen, "otherwise."⁷³

It could be objected that, by restricting its evidence to a handful of lines spoken by a single character in a single scene in a single play, this article has limited argumentative reach and is of little explanatory value. A fuller account of the play would select a principle of generalization—for example, gender and sexuality, Baroque poetics, or the ontology of nothing—and would expand its textual archive according to the logic of this principle. The methodological gamble of this article, by contrast, is that by placing sustained pressure on a single dramatic moment we are able to perform an act of thinking best described as inhabiting. "In" is a prefix rather than a preposition because it perpetually points toward a habit of thinking that does not turn its back on what is but translates the indicative into the conceptual sphere of poetic possibility. And "habit" specifies the temporal labor of this action: the act of inhabiting is iterative, taking place in and over time, such that the conceit becomes a way of being in the world as if from inside the aesthetic.⁷⁴ This kind of formalism proceeds from the assumption that thinking is an action in history, albeit only one among many possible actions. That thinking is the primary sphere of action is a limitation of the method, but it is also its promise. The apparent misogyny of our pervasive misreading of the Queen is not the effect of any particular methodology and its avowed or implicit politics but is instead the byproduct of a shared understanding of the reducibility of poetry to history.

In the difficult temporality of the Queen's conceit, what might have been exists only in a retrospective future that precludes intervention. Shakespeare offers us a device that opens our ears to what, according to Agamben, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's demiurge must close his own: "the incessant lamentation that, throughout the infinite chambers of this Baroque inferno of potentiality, arises from everything that could have been but was not, from everything that could have been otherwise but had to be sacrificed for the present world to be as it is."⁷⁵ Shakespeare invents a temporal perspective, but he does not invent a time machine. The Queen's conceit consigns Shakespeare's retrospective potentiality to a history we are powerless to avert. In this way, the conceit may seem, as with Daniel's "mightie burthen" or Genette's blank record, to compel silence from its audience. Yet again, the conceit may also attempt to restore potentiality to a past moment by inventing the perspective from which the past is in the future: potentiality is restored to history when you are able to say, with the Queen, this

is where what will be might have been “otherwise.”⁷⁶ When this saying is also a form of refusal, it may even create the conditions for pleasure.

NOTES

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¹ Shakespeare, *King Richard II*, ed. Charles R. Forker, Arden Shakespeare Third Series, gen. eds. Richard Proudfoot, Ann Thompson, and David Scott Kastan (London: Arden, 2002), II.ii.31. Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent references to *Richard II* are from this text and will appear parenthetically in the text and notes by act, scene, and line number.

² Melissa E. Sanchez notes the tendency to “characteriz[e] ... the Queen’s anxiety as a form of women’s intuition” (“Bodies that Matter in *Richard II*,” in *Richard II: New Critical Essays*, ed. Jeremy Lopez [London: Routledge, 2012], pp. 95–116, 113n22). For more uses of “intuition,” see Linda Bamber, *Comic Women, Tragic Men: A Study of Gender and Genre in Shakespeare* (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1982), p. 4; Philippa Berry, *Shakespeare’s Feminine Endings: Disfiguring Death in the Tragedies* (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 8; Shakespeare, *Richard II*, ed. Anthony B. Dawson and Paul Yachnin (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2011), p. 55; and Forker, line note to II.ii.18, p. 490n2.2.18. Andrew Cutrofello describes the Queen as possessing Kantian “intuition” in *All for Nothing: Hamlet’s Negativity* (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2014), pp. 56–7. James A. Knapp offers a considerably nuanced understanding of “intuition” as the “oscillat[ion] between a medieval form of Avicennian, physicalised intuition ... and a Thomist defence of the immateriality of the soul” (“Richard II’s Silent, Tortured Soul [Nietzsche, Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Luc Marion, and Levinas],” in *Shakespeare and Continental Philosophy*, ed. Jennifer Ann Bates and Richard Wilson [Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 2014], pp. 94–118, 110–1).

³ Paul Gaudet, “The ‘Parasitical’ Counselors in Shakespeare’s *Richard II*: A Problem in Dramatic Interpretation,” *SQ* 33, 2 (Summer 1982): 142–54, 148.

⁴ Scott McMillin, “Shakespeare’s *Richard II*: Eyes of Sorrow, Eyes of Desire” *SQ* 35, 1 (Spring 1984): 40–52, 40.

⁵ Jean E. Howard and Phyllis Rackin, *Engendering a Nation: A Feminist Account of Shakespeare’s English Histories* (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 138.

⁶ Jeanie Grant Moore, “Queen of Sorrow, King of Grief: Reflections and Perspectives in *Richard II*,” in *In Another Country: Feminist Perspectives on Renaissance Drama*, ed. Dorothea Kehler and Susan Baker (Metuchen NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1991), pp. 19–35, 25.

⁷ Moore, p. 19. See also Graham Holderness, "A Woman's War": A Feminist Reading of *Richard II*," in *Shakespeare Left and Right*, ed. Ivo Kamps (New York: Routledge, 1991), pp. 167–83, 177. By contrast, Helen Ostovich and Deanne Williams argue that Shakespeare preserved the historical queen's youth so as to highlight her virginity. See Ostovich, "'Here in This Garden': The Iconography of the Virgin Queen in Shakespeare's *Richard II*," in *Marian Moments in Early Modern British Drama*, ed. Regina Buccola and Lisa Hopkins (Aldershot UK: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 21–34; and Williams, "Isabelle de France, Child Bride," in *French Connections in the English Renaissance*, ed. Catherine Gimelli Martin and Hassan Melehy (Farnham UK: Ashgate, 2013), pp. 27–47.

⁸ Moore, p. 26.

⁹ For uses of "premonition," see Ronald Levao, *Renaissance Minds and Their Fictions: Cusanus, Sidney, Shakespeare* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1985), p. 306; Ostovich, p. 26; Henry E. Jacobs, "Prophecy and Ideology in Shakespeare's *Richard II*," *SoAR* 51, 1 (January 1986): 3–17, 5; and Berry, p. 1. Christopher Pye writes, "the queen feels the grief at once as something that will emerge in the ripeness of time and as something that comes toward her from an already established futurity" (*The Regal Phantasm: Shakespeare and the Politics of Spectacle* [London: Routledge, 1990], p. 93). Holderness describes the Queen's "grief without cause" as "a prophetic monitor of immanent calamity" (p. 176). Dawson and Yachnin describe the Queen as having "a form of prophetic knowledge—information about the history of the future" (pp. 55–6).

¹⁰ Zenón Luis-Martínez, "Shakespeare's Historical Drama as *Trauerspiel*: *Richard II*—and After," *ELH* 75, 3 (Fall 2008): 673–705, 683.

¹¹ York describes this model of time and its undoing:

Take Hereford's rights away, and take from Time
His charters and his customary rights;
Let not tomorrow then ensue today.

(II.i.195–7)

¹² In the *British Medical Journal*, Theodore Dalrymple diagnoses the Queen as "suffer[ing] from an anxiety state" ("Nameless Woe," *BMJ* 344, 7860 [9 June 2012]: 32). Reinhard Kuhn describes the Queen as "the victim of melancholy" (*The Demon of Noontide: Ennui in Western Literature* [Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1976], p. 95). For more uses of "anxiety," see Harry Berger Jr., *Harrying: Skills of Offense in Shakespeare's Henriad* (New York: Fordham Univ. Press, 2015), p. 35; Ostovich, p. 26; and Dawson and Yachnin, p. 55.

¹³ A handful of critics address the location of the "unborn sorrow," but they tend to incorporate "Fortune's womb" into the Queen's reproductive system. See Ostovich, p. 26; Holderness, p. 177; McMillan, p. 42; Williams, p. 40; and Luis-Martínez, p. 685.

¹⁴ On the concept of conceit, see Rosemond Tuve, *Elizabethan and Metaphysical Imagery: Renaissance Poetic and Twentieth-Century Critics* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1947), esp. p. 264; K. K. Ruthven, *The Conceit* (London: Methuen, 1969); Alastair Fowler, "The Shakespearean Conceit," in *Conceitful Thought: The Interpretation of English Renaissance Poems* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 1975), pp. 87–113; Christopher Johnson, "Conceit," in *The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics*, 4th edn., ed. Roland Greene

(Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2012), pp. 289–91; and Hugh Grady, *John Donne and Baroque Allegory: The Aesthetics of Fragmentation* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2017), esp. pp. 137–206.

¹⁵ Johnson, p. 289.

¹⁶ See Ruthven, pp. 5–16. Grady describes Donne's "Metaphysical conceits" as "fragmented allegories" (pp. 137–69, 138).

¹⁷ See, for example, Allan Shickman, "The 'Perspective Glass' in Shakespeare's *Richard II*," *SEL* 18, 2 (Spring 1978): 217–28.

¹⁸ See *Royal Shakespeare Company: Richard II*, directed by Gregory Doran (Opus Arte, 2013), DVD, 180 min.

¹⁹ Luis-Martínez writes, "The Queen's failure to elucidate forthcoming events is allegorized as maternal failure to give birth to an 'unborn sorrow' that is yet 'ripe'" (p. 683).

²⁰ Katherine Eggert, *Disknowledge: Literature, Alchemy, and the End of Humanism in Renaissance England* (Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), p. 3.

²¹ Berger, *Harrying*, p. 35. In *Making Trifles of Terrors: Redistributing Complicities in Shakespeare*, Berger describes the Queen's "silence about the actual character of Richard's regime ... a silence so conspicuous as to seem willfully to avoid what her sometimes tortured language shows she understands too well" ([Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1997], p. 177).

²² My use of "conspicuous" is indebted to Berger. See, for example, *The Allegorical Temper: Vision and Reality in Book II of Spenser's "Faerie Queene"* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1957), p. 122.

²³ Lopez, introduction to *Richard II: New Critical Essays*, pp. 1–50, 3–4.

²⁴ Lopez, p. 4.

²⁵ Philip Lorenz, "'Christall Mirrors'—Analogy and Onto-Theology in Shakespeare and Francisco Suárez," *R&L* 38, 3 (Autumn 2006): 101–19, 109.

²⁶ Sir Philip Sidney, *The Defence of Poesy*, in *The Major Works*, ed. Katherine Duncan-Jones, Oxford World's Classics (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1989), pp. 212–50, 235.

²⁷ On the lexical articulation of open-ended futurity, see J. K. Barret, *Untold Futures: Time and Literary Cultures in Renaissance England* (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 2016), pp. 16–7.

²⁸ For uses of "the 'unborn sorrow,'" see Dawson and Yachnin, p. 55; Howard and Rackin, p. 138; and Berger, *Harrying*, p. 35. For "Isabel's 'unborn sorrow,'" see Sanchez, p. 107. For uses of "her 'unborn sorrow,'" see McMillin, p. 45; Pye, p. 93; Tobias Döring, *Performances of Mourning in Shakespearean Theater and Early Modern Culture* (Hampshire UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 63; and Gaudet, p. 153.

²⁹ Holderness, p. 176.

³⁰ Knapp, p. 104. Knapp is quoting Marina Paola Banchetti-Robino's analysis of Thomas Aquinas in "Ibn Sinā and Husserl on Intention and Intentionality," *PE&W* 54, 1 (January 2004): 71–82, 74.

³¹ Knapp, pp. 106–7.

³² See Eggert's recent work, "Othello's Happiness" (presentation, Shakespeare Association of America, New Orleans LA, 26 March 2016).

³³ On contingency, see Daniel Heller-Roazen, *Fortune's Faces: The "Roman de la Rose" and the Poetics of Contingency* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins

Univ. Press, 2003), esp. pp. 11–28; and Giorgio Agamben, “Bartleby, or On Contingency,” in *Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy*, trans. Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1999), pp. 243–71.

³⁴ Helen Cooper, *Shakespeare and the Medieval World*, Arden Critical Companion (London: Arden, 2010), p. 143. On the relation of fortune to providence, see Alain Legros, “Montaigne between Fortune and Providence,” in *Chance, Literature, and Culture in Early Modern France* (Farnham UK: Ashgate, 2009), pp. 17–30. See also Frederick Kiefer, *Fortune and Elizabethan Tragedy* (San Marino CA: Huntington Library Press, 1983), pp. 232–43; and Raymond Chapman, “The Wheel of Fortune in Shakespeare’s Historical Plays,” *RES* 1, 1 (January 1950): 1–7.

³⁵ “From *A Myrroure for Magistrates* (1559),” in *Earlier English History Plays: Henry VI, Richard II, Richard III*, vol. 3 of *Narrative and Dramatic Sources of Shakespeare*, 8 vols., ed. Geoffrey Bullough (London: Routledge, 1960), pp. 415–22, 420, line 8.

³⁶ *A Myrroure for Magistrates*, lines 9–10.

³⁷ Chapman, p. 1; *OED*, 2d edn., s.v. “fortune, *n.*,” etymology; and Charles T. Lewis and Charles Short, *A Latin Dictionary*, s.v. “fero,” <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0059%3Aenry%3Dfero>, accessed 18 October 2019.

³⁸ Heller-Roazen, p. 67. See also Kiefer, p. 239.

³⁹ Heller-Roazen, p. 76.

⁴⁰ See, for example, Berger, *Harrying*, p. 33.

⁴¹ Simon Palfrey describes “at another level happening in ... scenic gobbets that are not so much superseded as hanging in the air ... their modality in a strange limbo between indicative and subjunctive” (*Shakespeare’s Possible Worlds* [Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2014], p. 171).

⁴² Sanchez, p. 107.

⁴³ On Richard’s pleasure and on pleasure unredeemed by virtue in literary criticism, see Corey McEleney, “Bonfire of the Vanities,” in *Futile Pleasures: Early Modern Literature and the Limits of Utility* (New York: Fordham Univ. Press, 2017), pp. 37–64.

⁴⁴ Edward Hall, “From *The Union of Two Noble Families of Lancastre and Yorke* by Edward Hall (1548),” in *Narrative and Dramatic Sources*, 3:383–7, 383. See also “From *The Third Volume of Chronicles*, by R. Holinshed (1587 edition),” in *Narrative and Dramatic Sources*, 3:387–415, 388 and 402.

⁴⁵ See Paul Menzer, “c.f. Marlowe,” in *Richard II: New Critical Essays*, pp. 117–34, esp. pp. 122–6.

⁴⁶ See McEleney, pp. 46 and 54.

⁴⁷ On grief in Shakespeare’s historiography, see Luis-Martinez; and John J. Joughin, “*Richard II* and the Performance of Grief,” in *Shakespeare’s Histories and Counter-Histories*, ed. Dermot Cavanagh, Stuart Hampton-Reeves, and Stephen Longstaffe (Manchester UK: Manchester Univ. Press, 2006), pp. 15–31.

⁴⁸ See Berry, pp. 1–2.

⁴⁹ See the Duchess of Glouster in I.ii.54–5; Bolingbroke in I.iii.273–4; Gaunt in II.i.75–6; and the Queen’s echoing of “Grief” as “guest” to Richard in V.i.14.

⁵⁰ Eugenie Brinkema, *The Forms of the Affects* (Durham NC: Duke Univ. Press, 2014), p. 73. I am grateful to Kyla Wazana Tompkins for sending me to this book.

⁵¹ Brinkema, p. 73.

⁵² Brinkema, p. 95.

⁵³ Barret, *Untold Futures*, p. 170.

⁵⁴ See Agamben, pp. 243–71.

⁵⁵ Agamben, p. 254.

⁵⁶ See Ruthven, pp. 5–11 and 41–5; Grady, pp. 172–206; and Williams, esp. p. 40.

⁵⁷ On form and action at a distance, see Timothy Morton on “the aesthetic dimension, the dimension of relations” as “the causal dimension” (“An Object-Oriented Defense of Poetry,” *NLH* 43, 2 [Spring 2012]: 205–24, 217 and 220). Palfrey writes of Shakespeare’s sense of history: “Often events will be moved by some version of action at a distance, such as scenic rhymes, prophecy, or words coming telepathically true” (p. 174).

⁵⁸ This reading runs against Palfrey’s account of “formactions” as “existential allegories, personifications of past and future possibility” (p. 130).

⁵⁹ On Samuel Daniel’s influence on Shakespeare, see Richard Meek, “Rue e’en for ruth’: *Richard II* and the Imitation of Sympathy,” in *The Renaissance of Emotion: Understanding Affect in Shakespeare and His Contemporaries*, ed. Meek and Erin Sullivan (Manchester UK: Manchester Univ. Press, 2015), pp. 130–52.

⁶⁰ Daniel, *The Civil Wars*, ed. Laurence Michel (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1958), book 2, stanza 76, line 6.

⁶¹ Daniel, 2.78.4–6.

⁶² Daniel, 2.92.3–8.

⁶³ Gérard Genette, *Figures of Literary Discourse*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1982), p. 43n52.

⁶⁴ See Stephen Booth, *Precious Nonsense: The Gettysburg Address, Ben Jonson’s Epitaphs on His Children, and “Twelfth Night”* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1998).

⁶⁵ Christopher Warley, *Reading Class through Shakespeare, Donne, and Milton* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2014), p. 27. See also Theodor W. Adorno, “On Lyric Poetry and Society,” trans. Shierry Weber Nicholson, in *The Lyric Theory Reader: A Critical Anthology*, ed. Virginia Jackson and Yopie Prins (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2014), pp. 339–50, 340.

⁶⁶ Warley, p. 7.

⁶⁷ Warley, p. 27.

⁶⁸ Andrew Miller, “Implicative Criticism, or The Display of Thinking,” in “Styles of Criticism,” special issue, *NLH* 44, 3 (Summer 2013): 345–60, 347.

⁶⁹ See, for example, Stephen Cohen, ed., *Shakespeare and Historical Formalism* (Aldershot UK: Ashgate, 2007).

⁷⁰ See Alan Liu, “The Power of Formalism: The New Historicism,” *ELH* 56, 4 (Winter 1989): 721–71.

⁷¹ Caroline Levine, *Forms: Whole, Rhythm, Hierarchy, Network* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2015), p. 8. See also Levine, pp. 16–9.

⁷² Sandra Macpherson defines “form as nothing more—and nothing less—than the shape matter (whether a poem or a tree) takes” (“A Little Formalism,” *ELH* 82, 2 [Summer 2015]: 385–405, 390).

⁷³ Adorno writes: "In its protest the poem expresses the dream of a world in which things would be different" (p. 340). On Adorno's account of art as a political reboot of Kantian formalism, see Robert Kaufman, "Red Kant, or The Persistence of the Third *Critique* in Adorno and Jameson," *Critl* 26, 4 (Summer 2000): 682–724, 711.

⁷⁴ On habit in the ethopoeic tradition, see Barret, "Habit," in *Entertaining the Idea: Shakespeare, Philosophy, Performance*, ed. Julia Lupton, Lowell Gallagher, and James Kearney (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, forthcoming).

⁷⁵ Agamben, p. 266. See also Palfrey, pp. 228–42. On the aesthetics of lamentation as a historiographical practice that "captures the subject in his commerce with his own temporality," see Luis-Martínez, p. 676.

⁷⁶ See Agamben on Walter Benjamin and remembrance: "Remembrance is neither what happened nor what did not happen but, rather, their potentialization, their becoming possible once again" (p. 267).

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